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INTRODUCTION

I.

Simplot continues t0 perpetuate the District Court’s faulty decision below by
insisting that its version 0f the facts is the sole version. Plainly, Simplot maintains

that Startup

Manager was a temporary assignment

Packaging Engineer position. While Simplot
0f its version 0f the facts, a jury

That

is

particularly true here

self-serving statements

myriad

facts

claims. See

might instead find alternative

where Simplot’s version

made during

Opening

litigation.

facts

0f the facts is

more

plausible.

grounded in

Meanwhile, Knudsen has presented

Knudsen has presented

only intended

him

to

it

facts

Knudsen

all

Which support that Simplot

was hiring him as a

work

full-time

in that job part-time,

and

Packaging Engineer
t0 also

work 0n the

operations/equipment side as a part-time Startup Manager, an entirely separate
Id.

its

Brief, pp. 3-14.

knowingly misrepresented that
it

may ultimately be able t0 convince a jury

from Which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in his favor 0n

Specifically,

When

or duty 0f Knudsen’s full-time

will not restate the facts set forth in his

Opening

Brief,

job.

but will counter

Simplot’s statement 0f the facts With additional facts as warranted.
II.

RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS

Simplot focuses on irrelevant facts in What appears t0 be an attempt t0 suggest
that

Knudsen misled Simplot during the hiring

process, instead 0f the other

around. Regardless, these facts are addressed. First, Simplot makes
that

Knudsen impressed the hiring team With

much

way

0f the fact

talk about the project startup

work he

did While working at HP. See Respondent’s Brief (“Resp Brief”), pp. 3-4. However,

Simplot

knew that Knudsen had stepped down from the operations program manager
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HP

position at

Where he did the startup work

in order to return t0 a Packaging

Engineer position Where he was able t0 be more creative and align his work With his
career goals, strengths, and interests. R., pp. 423-24; R.,

p.

274-75 at 20325-2121, 2431-

may

3039-21} While Lyle Schook, Senior Director 0f Engineering

17; R., p. 2’77 at

have been “particularly impressed” With Knudsen’s operations startup work, see
Resp. Brief,

p. 4,

Schook kept secret from Knudsen that he never intended

as a full-time Packaging Engineer. Instead, Simplot

Startup Manager job part-time.

R., pp.

R., pp.

Knudsen

265-66 at 96323-97315;

him

put him in the

t0

291-92 at 107324-10933. There

that Simplot failed t0 disclose these plans t0

employment With Simplot.

had plans

t0 hire

prior t0

is

n0 dispute

him

starting

288 at 86314-24.

R., p.

Second, Simplot also contends that Schook had never hired anyone Without
food industry experience, but that

leadership
that the

skills, it

hired

Knudsen was

him anyway. See Resp.

company devoted one

of the

convincing regarding his

Brief, p. 5.

However, Simplot admits

two interview panels

candidates’ leadership skills? See Resp. Brief,
it

so

p.

4 citing R.,

p.

153 at 2011-5. Further,

was Simplot Who inquired about Knudsen’s work 0n the

Knowing that he lacked food

experience,

leadership abilities, using the

HP

discussing the

t0

HP

startup project.

Knudsen understandably emphasized

startup as one example. R.,

p. 2’76

his

at 27324-29315.

Knudsen had worked at HP as a Packaging Engineer/Sr. Packaging Engineer for
he took on the operations or manufacturing program manager position, a job he held
for eight years. Knudsen then went back t0 being a Sr. Packaging Engineer, the position he held when
he applied for the Packaging Engineer position With Simplot. R., p. 275 at 2431-17; R., p. 281 at 513111

Simplot

knew

that

six years before

52325; R., pp. 423-24.
2

The other panel focused 0n the candidates’ technical

skills.
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Knudsen simply “emphasized that

[he]

could figure out the role” as a Simplot

Packaging Engineer despite his lack 0f experience in the food industry.
Third,

the extent that Simplot suggests

t0

Knudsen’s failure
did not

want

Brief, p. 5.

to disclose that

to d0 that

work

he did not

like the startup

t0 list off the

why Knudsen

many jobs

t0

is

HP

at

and

misplaced. See Resp.

perform for several reasons including:

2) in

tell

t0 do the

for a

01"

interested

it

if

same program manager type work he did

he had started rolling through

all

he was unwilling or uninterested in performing. “I’m sure
that.” R., p.

That

he did not even think

Packaging Engineer position. He added that

pretty poor impression

in.

is

exactly

Simplot that he did not want t0 be a program

at Simplot. Specifically, he testified that

was applying

applying for one job, no one thinks

they are not well suited for

explained he did not

he did not want

had done

work he did

A job candidate is not going t0 discuss the many positions at the potential

would leave a negative impression; and

manager

some nefariousness behind

in the future, this suggestion

employer that he 0r she would never want
1) it

Id.

it

at

t0

say that

HP because he

would have

left

a

the various positions that
I

wouldn’t get the job

if I

304 at 202311-20432.

Simplot disputes that Knudsen was assigned the Startup Manager job 0n day
one.

As

support, Simplot says that its board did not approve the

equipment upgrade project until February
it

is

3

23, 2016,

and that

it

was

Grand Forks

at that time that

decided t0 assign Knudsen as the Startup Manager.3 See Resp. Brief, pp. 5-6. This
a quintessential example of a disputed

fact,

Which should have been taken into

Notably Kent Anderson, Director 0f Technical Engineering and Knudsen’s boss testified that he did
When Knudsen was told he was going t0 be the Startup Manager. R., p. 112 at 26215-24.

not recall
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Knudsen

consideration by the District Court and ultimately decided by a jury.
testified that

he was told 0n

121's

ﬁ'mt day ofwork that he would only spend

time as a Packaging Engineer and the other

50%

61323-6212; R., p. 286 at 70318-23; R., p. 425.

He

286 at 69312-19. This

also

November

30,

2015, listing

ﬂew

for the

t0

Grand Forks a few days

equipment upgrade.

R., p.

own documents dated

supported by one 0f Simplot’s

fact is

of his

as a Startup Manager. R., p. 284 at

and was introduced as the Startup Manager

later

50%

Knudsen as the Startup Manager.

R.,

pp.

369-73.

Moreover, Simplot informed fellow Packaging Engineer, Timothy Lalley, before

Knudsen

started that Simplot

had only hired him

to do

Packaging Engineering part-

time. R., p. 310 at 32320-33325. Others involved in the hiring process confirmed that

Simplot did not intend for Knudsen t0 work full-time as a Packaging Engineer.

R., p.

134; R. p. 265 at 94120-96322; R., p. 288 at 86314-24; R., pp. 291-92 at 108123-10913;

R.,

340 at 5036-13;

R., p.

344 at 122321-25.

during their meeting in June 2016.

When

the project

was

officially

R., pp.

Specifically,

Schook told Knudsen that

291-92 at 08123-10913. Thus, regardless of

blessed by the board, there are

that Simplot knew, prior t0 his start date,

it

many facts

to support

was not hiring Knudsen as a

Packaging Engineer. Instead Simplot intended, prior

to his hire, that

full-time

Knudsen work

part-time in a separate position of Startup Manager.

Simplot also argues that the Startup Manager job was temporary because

ends When the project ends. See Resp.
told

him

it

Brief, p. 6.

Knudsen

was a temporary assignment, and Simplot

projects beginning after the

Grand Forks

testified that

also

project. R., p.

it

n0 one ever

had numerous startup
284 at 61110-6333. For
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example, Craig Lamberton, Director of Packaging Engineering testified that “in the

Wings was another project the

Which was $100+ million dollar project

size of Idaho,”

make

prior t0 Knudsen’s hire. Simplot “wanted to

developed to do

it

better.” R.,

we had

sure

p 320 at 26112-27223. Even

if it

in-house skills

were a temporary job,

does not alter Schook’s admission that he never intended to hire Knudsen as a

time Packaging Engineer, the job he applied

for,

accepted,

and

left his

it

full-

HP career for.

R. pp. 291-92 at 108323-10913.

Simplot relies 0n Anderson’s testimony for support that the Startup Manager

was simply an assignment Within Knudsen’s
R., pp. 107-09.

While Anderson’s testimony

Packaging Engineer Lalley clearly

job duties.

is less

See Resp.

than clear 0n that point, Senior

full-time

the

had never been

testified that Lalley himself

assigned t0 be a Startup Manager or performed those duties. R.,
11137. Additionally,

Brief, p. 7 citing

p.

314 at 108125-

Schook told Lalley that Simplot had not hired Knudsen

Packaging Engineer and

t0

make

same job as Lalley and Jason Schwark

sure

Knudsen

(the other

be a

t0

did not confuse that he

Packaging Engineer).

had

R., p.

176

at 10717-10814.

Finally,

Knudsen wrote

to the Vice President of

over 2 months before his termination. In that email
t0

HR on June

Knudsen asked

21, 2016, a little

if it

was “normal

ask a new hire to learn two completely separate jobs? Obviously every job has

variations With lots 0f different projects/tasks/etc. This

completely separate jobs With n0 overlap.”

R., pp. 390-91.

is

different.

I

have two

This evidence would allow

a reasonable fact-finder t0 question Simplot’s convenient excuse that the Startup
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Manager job was just a “temporary assignment.” That factual dispute should not have
been decided as a matter 0f law by the District Court.

REPLY ARGUMENT

III.

Knudsen

first replies t0

dismissal 0f his case 0n

Simplot’s argument regarding the District Court’s

summary judgment. Then, Knudsen responds

t0 Simplot’s

Cross Appeal regarding the District Court’s decision t0 deny Simplot fees.

Knudsen Izas Presen ted Suﬁcjent Facts Supporting 121's Ea ud Claim.

A.

On

appeal, Simplot does not contest the District Court’s legal conclusion that

there can be fraud in an at-Will hiring. For the reasons set forth in Knudsen’s Opening
Brief, this

Opening

Court should affirm the District Court’s conclusion on that issue. See

Brief, pp. 17-18.

Rather, Simplot focuses 0n the District Court’s finding that Knudsen has not
identified

any false statement or misrepresentation by Simplot. See Resp.

citing R., p. 454.

As

set forth in the

Opening

Brief, this conclusion is

court’s finding 0f facts in Simplot’s favor.4

evidence on material issues, or

summary judgment

is

if

However, When there

Brief, p. 12

based 0n the
is

conﬂicting

reasonable minds could reach different conclusions,

not appropriate.

Massey V. Conagra Food, Ina, 156 Idaho

476,

479, 328 P.3d 456, 459 (2014).5

Simplot correctly states that the District Court recognized its duty t0 draw
Knudsen’s favor and points t0 the court’s statement that it had done s0. See Resp.
R., p. 455. However, just because the court so stated does not make it true.
4

all

inferences in

Brief, p. 13 citing

Simplot also seems t0 suggest that this Court apply an elevated summary judgment burden of proof
requiring a showing 0f clear and convincing evidence at the dispositive motion stage. This Court
5

G&M Farms V. Funk In". 00., 119 Idaho
Knudsen need not prove that he Will Win at trial, only

rejected adopting the elevated standard for fraud cases
514, 518, 808 P.2d 851, 855 (1991). Moreover,

1'12
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Knudsen maintains that he was

told

on his

day 0f work that he would

first

spend only part-time doing Packaging Engineer work, the position he had applied,
interviewed

for,

and accepted as

full-time position. R., p.

284 at 61323-6232;

at 70318-23; R. p. 425. Just a few days into his career, Simplot

Simplot’s plant in

Grand Forks and introduced him

t0 the

0n an internal announcement) as the Startup Manager.

R., p.

286

ﬂew Knudsen

t0

group (and listed Knudsen

R., p.

286 at 69112-19;

R., pp.

369-73.

By continuing
management
its

to

conclude that Knudsen was simply assigned “startup

duties” as part 0f his Packaging Engineer position, Simplot perpetuates

version 0f the facts, which are in dispute as followsi
o

Simplot told Lalley before Knudsen started that Simplot had only hired him to

be a Packaging Engineer part-time.
o

Simplot

R., p.

310 at 32320-33325.

knew they did not have “100 percent workload for somebody t0

0n packaging materials and had a need

for the

.

.

.

equipment side 0f things.”

work
R., p.

265 at 95319-25.
o

Simplot was looking for someone t0 be Startup Manager, but n0 one told

Knudsen

of that fact 0r that

0n the operations

he would have

side. R., p. 134; R. p.

24; R., pp. 291-92 at 108323-10933; R.,
o

An

internal Simplot

memo

changes,” including that

that there

is

t0 help

With packaging equipment

265 at 94120-96322;

340 at 5036-13;

disclosed that they

Knudsen was

R., p.

V.

288 at 86114-

344 at 122321-25.

had made “organizational

to report t0

a triable issue. Country Cove Development, Inc.

R., p.

Anderson and “deliver

May, 148 Idaho 595,599, 150 P.3d 288,

292 (2006).
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support t0 the technical need for Packaging Operations as well,” While the other

Packaging Engineers reported
front
o

end

to

Schook and would “continue

t0 focus

0n the

0f the business.” R., p. 357.

The other Packaging Engineers, Who were overloaded With work, were
frustrated that they did not have Knudsen’s full-time help and that he

spending a

lot of

time as Startup Manager.

R., p.

287 at 7415-8; R.

p.

was

311 at

95119-21; 354 at 45313-19.
o

Schook told Lalley that Simplot had not hired Knudsen

t0

d0 the same job as he

and Schwark, and that he should ensure Knudsen was not confused about
R., p.

o

176 at 10717-10834.

Schook told Knudsen directly thati “You know What?

you

that.

t0

I

never intended t0 put

be a full-time [P]ackaging [E]nginner from the day

I

hired you.” R., pp.

291-92 at 108123-10913.
o

A week after Knudsen complained t0 HR about being lied t0,

Simplot advertised

a position that focused 0n the operations/equipment side that

been spending half his time

Knudsen had

0n. This posting explicitly disclosed that “providing

technical oversight t0 construction

& startup activities” was a job responsibility.

R., pp. 397-98.

Based 0n these

Manager

job

facts,

a reasonable jury could certainly conclude that the Startup

was not simply part

0f the

jury could also conclude that Simplot

Packaging Engineer position.

knew

all

along that

it

A reasonable

was not hiring Knudsen

as a full-time Packaging Engineer.
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Simplot also argues that

if

Knudsen was

misled, he

was misled about What he

would be working 0n in the future, such that there can be no fraud. See Resp.
pp. 14-16. This once again mischaracterizes

that

it

was hiring him as a

full-time

Brief,

Knudsen’s claim. Simplot told Knudsen

Packaging Engineer When

part-time Packaging Engineer. That representation

an

is

it

only hired

him as a

existing, not future, fact.

Moreover, the cases Simplot relies upon set out exceptions t0 the general rule
that an action for fraud does not

lie for

statements 0f future events. Such exceptions

have long been recognized in Idaho. See Sharp

V.

Idaho InV. Corp, 95 Idaho 113, 122,

504 P.2d 386, 395 (1972)(citing Pocatello Security Trust Co.

206

P.

175 (1922); Mller-Caboon Co.
In Country Cove Development

(2006), this Court set forth
Will

be undertaken

and

2)

is

v.

V.

an opinion can amount

if

May, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288, 294

the speaker

t0 a false

Henry, 35 Idaho 321,

Wade, 38 Idaho 484, 221 P. 1102 (1923)).

two such exceptions:

actionable

V.

1)

a promise or statement that an act

made

statement

it

Without intending to keep

if it is

deceiving or misleading.6 Likewise, in Apr. Beguesse, Inc.

made With
V.

it

the intention of

Rammell, 156 Idaho 500,

510, 328 P.3d 480, 490 (2014), this Court reiterated the two exceptions (albeit using
slightly different language) including: 1) statements

deceive and 2) promises Which

statements were

6

The fraud

might
Id.

d0,”

false.7 (citing Gillespie

at issue in

1.6.,

show the promisor’s

commit

V.

made with
ability to

the intention t0

perform and those

Mountain Park Estates,

L.L.C., 142 Idaho

Country Cove Development was a statement “[p]ostulating What [defendant]
he did not get favorable terms in contract negotiations With plaintiff.

suicide, if

143 Idaho at 601, 150 P.3d at 294. This Court held that statement was “too speculative t0 constitute
fact and is too speculative to constitute a false prediction. ”Id.

an existing
7

This Court affirmed the jury’s finding in favor 0f plaintiff 0n her fraud claim in Apr. Beguesse, Ina,
Which was based 0n statements made by the defendant-seller 0f a business that it owned assets worth
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671, 674, 132 P.3d 428, 431 (2006)). Finally in

PA,

Thomas

V.

Medical Center Physicians,

138 Idaho 200, 207, 61 P.3d 557, 564 (2002), the statements at issue were policy

statements about future events (9g, that defendant “would require

work within the standard

Thomas had

intentions of following through on

was

physicians” t0

of care, “would maintain appropriate quality control

measures,” and “would enforce” that
This Court held that

its

its

physicians followed the standard 0f care).

failed to

its

show that the Medical Center had no

representations at the time

it

made them, Which

fatal to his fraud claim.

Here, even

if this

Court were t0 find that the job

offer

Simplot

made t0 Knudsen

related t0 a future event, a reasonable jury could conclude that Simplot knew, at the

time

it

made

the

offer,

that

it

did not intend t0 have

Knudsen work as a

Packaging Engineer. Thus, this case meets the above exceptions and,
set forth in his

Opening Brief and above, the

District Court should not

full-time

for the reasons

have dismissed

Knudsen’s fraud claim. Instead, the jury should have been called upon

t0

determine

the facts.
B.

Knudsen has Presen ted Sufﬁcient Facts

t0

Support 111's Promissory

Estoppel Claim.
Simplot correctly states that the District Court found that Knudsen “failed t0
bring forth any evidence that a promise was made.” See Resp. Brief,
p.

461.

As With the fraud claim, the

at least a million dollars,

court’s conclusion

p.

18 quoting

R.,

was based on its chosen version

Which defendant argued on appeal were merely opinions and future

predictions. Apr. Beguesse, Ina, 156 Idaho at 509-510, 328 P.3d at 489-90.
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0f the facts, ignoring that Simplot failed to deliver

0n

its

promise t0 hire Knudsen as

a full-time Packaging Engineer.

Simplot also summarily contends that Knudsen failed t0 demonstrate proof of
“substantial economic loss.” See Resp. Brief,
appeal, perhaps Simplot
losses,

70.

means

to repeat its

p.

20.

Although not articulated on

argument below that Knudsen has n0

because he did not forgo a substantially higher salary at HP. See

R., pp. 67-

This argument perverts the concept 0f reliance damages. Knudsen has substantial

economic damages, as supported by his disclosed economic loss expert, resulting from
his exit from his secure career at

6474051 at *5

(D.

Idaho NOV.

HP. As in Harvey

18, 2014), substantial

V.

harm

Manmus
is

2014

1110.,

evidenced by

WL

plaintiff’s

termination from defendant and/or forgoing other secure employment.
C.

Knudsen

15'

Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim Should be Presented t0

a Jury.
Simplot asserts that Knudsen does not “explicate What already existing
contract term or duty Simplot purportedly violated.” See Resp. Brief,
clearly pointed t0

two terms Simplot violated:

a Packaging Engineer full-time, and

2)

telling

Knudsen 0n

his first

that he

was being hired

Knudsen

t0

work as

that he would not be retaliated against for

making an internal complaint. See Opening

By

1)

p. 21.

Brief, pp. 32-34; R., pp.

221-22.

day 0f work that Simplot intended only

t0

have

him work as a Packaging Engineer

job half-time, Simplot “significantly impair[ed]

0f the

Whether express 0r implied.” Metcalf

[the]

benefit

Intermountain Gas

.

00.,

.

.

contract,

V.

116 Idaho 622, 627, 788 P.2d 744, 749 (1989). Knudsen’s

Packaging Engineer job was “going really

well,” as

he was able

to “contribute
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make a good impact.” R.,
0f the contract,

129.,

that he would not

the Startup

pp. 291-92 at 107124-10913.

the ability to d0 that position full-time, there

still

Manager

is

no reason

to think

be working at Simplot. Instead, Simplot assigned Knudsen t0

position, a position for

which he was not well-suited

because he did not have the right experience
Simplot

Had Knudsen gotten the benefit

knew Knudsen was

for that position). It is

struggling in that the Startup

(especially

undisputed that

Manager position; Simplot

even placed Knudsen 0n an improvement plan related to his work as a Startup

Manager.

R., p.

293 at 11316-11;

R., p. 392.

By finding facts in Simplot’s favor, the District Court characterized the Startup
Manager position as part and parcel of his Packaging Engineer job. As
was

able to conclude that there

such, the court

was “nothing that would preclude a packaging

engineer from acting as a startup manager on a project” and then conclude that there

was n0 breach

0f the covenant. R., p. 460.

Knudsen presented

facts

But as discussed in section

III. A.,

above,

from Which a reasonable jury could draw the opposite

conclusion. 8

Further, Simplot does not substantively address Knudsen’s argument that

breached the covenant of good faith in retaliating against him

it

for reporting his

concerns about fraud in direct Violation 0f Simplot policy and contemporaneous
representations that

it

would not d0

so.

Instead, Simplot argues that, because the

Simplot contends that Knudsen cited to its summary judgment opposition for support that he was
only allowed t0 work as a Packaging Engineer 0n a part-time basis. See Resp. Brief, p. 21 citing
Opening Brief, p. 34. This is not correct. In the Opening Brief, Knudsen cited t0 the opposition t0
summary judgment t0 support the statement that he had made a particular argument to the District
Court below. See Opening Brief, p. 34. However, Knudsen cited t0 the evidentiary record below and
8

also

on appeal

Brief, pp. 3-14

for support that he was only hired to be a Packaging Engineer part-time. See Opening
With citations t0 the record, and Response t0 Statement 0f Facts above.
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court cited the Metcalfcase,

it

must have considered

court’s decision is Wholly devoid 0f

this claim.

However, the lower

of breach

based 0n Simplot’s

any consideration

anti-retaliation policy. R., pp. 459-60. Regardless, Simplot has failed to articulate

cogent reasons

Why this Court

should uphold the dismissal of the good faith and fair

dealing claim based 0n Simplot’s policy.
there
2)

A reasonable jury

was an implied contract term prohibiting

that Simplot terminated

any

Knudsen because

could determine that:

retaliation for filing a complaint;

0f his complaint.

See Opening

1)

and

Brief, pp.

32-34.

D.

Knudsen ’s Negligent Inﬂjction Claim 1's Supported by Sufﬁcient Facts.

Simplot accuses Knudsen of bootstrapping this claim t0 recover emotional
distress

damages due

See Resp.

t0 Simplot’s fraudulent conduct.

Brief, p. 24.

A

negligent inﬂiction claim always requires that a plaintiff prove that the defendant

breached a legal duty recognized by law. Wright
P.3d 58, 68 (2016), overruled

011

V.

Ada

other grounds by Eller

Idaho 147, 443 P3d 161 (2019). Thus,

if

damages,

V.

Knudsen can prove

have also proven a breach 0f a legal duty. The jury
distress

Cty.,

assuming Knudsen

can

is

prove

160 Idaho 491, 501, 376

Idaho State

Police,

165

his fraud claim, he Will

permitted t0 award emotional
causation

and a physical

manifestation. Id.

Simplot attempts t0 distinguish

Hathaway V. Bd ofRegentS 0f Univ.

155 Idaho 255, 270, 310 P.3d 315, 330 (2013), stating that

Knudsen

did not allege a Violation of the Idaho

plaintiff did in

Hatbeway. See Resp.

Human

Brief, p. 24. Simplot’s

it is

ofldallo,

unhelpful because

Rights Act (IHRA) like the

argument misses the
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The holding

in

Hatbeway supports

that negligent inﬂiction can be a companion

(01"

bootstrapped) claim t0 another cause 0f action, Which provides the legal duty element,

such as the

IHRA Violations

in

Hathaway, or fraud in

this case.

Additionally, as Simplot recognizes, a plaintiff typically cannot recover for

mental anguish in fraud cases. See Resp.

Brief, p.

24

(citing

Walston

V.

Monumental

Life Ins. 00., 129 Idaho 211, 218, 923 P.2d 456, 463 (1996)). Therefore, unlike the

Whistleblower claim in

E1191",

165 Idaho at 157, 443 P.3d at 171,9 Which this Court

held provided a direct route t0 recovery emotional distress damages, here the

companion claim

of negligent inﬂiction is not duplicative 0r

pre-empted by Knudsen’s

fraud claim.

The

District Court dismissed this claim, because

duty t0 disclose

all 0f

the duties or tasks that

it

held that Simplot had n0

Knudsen might be asked

to

perform in

his Packaging Engineer position. Again, the court incorrectly determined facts in

Simplot’s favor. Absent this fact-finding, the District Court could not have granted

summary judgment
E.

t0

Simplot 0n his negligent inﬂiction claim.

ReliefRequested

Because a reasonable jury could

reject Simplot’s version of the facts in favor of

those supporting Knudsen’s claims, this Court should vacate judgment in favor of

Simplot and remand

9

all of

Knudsen’s claims

Simplot did not address the Eller case in

for trial.

its brief.
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IV.

RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL

Simplot makes three primary arguments supporting reversal of the District
Court’s decision declining t0

award attorney

the District Court abused

discretion because “the

its

commercial transaction.” See Resp.

Knudsen

34. Third,

0f the

these arguments

is

0n

all

is

a

Simplot argues that because

t0 that

same

statute.10

See

Simplot argues that the District Court should have “at the

fees t0 Simplot for prevailing

Complaint

under Idaho Code §12-120(3), Simplot should

pursuant

fees

gravamen

Brief, p. 29. Second,

also requested attorney fees,

have been awarded attorney

fees below. First, Simplot argues that

contract-based claims.”11 See

id,

id,

at pp. 33-

least,

awarded

at p. 34.

Each

of

Without merit.

Standard ofReVieW

A.

“An award
and subject

t0

of attorney fees

an abuse

and

costs is Within the discretion 0f the trial court

of discretion standard 0f review.” Kenwortll Sales Co.

V.

Skinner Trucking, Ina, 165 Idaho 938, 943, 454 P.3d 580, 585 (2019) (quoting
Dickinson Frozen Foods, Inc.

V.

JR. Simplot

1282 (2019), as amended (Apr. 22, 2019)).
t0

00.,

On

164 Idaho 669, 676, 434 P.3d 1275,

appeal, this Court uses a four-part test

review an alleged abuse 0f discretion by the district court:

Whether the

trial court:

(1)

correctly perceived the issue as one 0f

discretion; (2) acted Within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3)

acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise 0f

choices available t0

reason.

10

This argument Will be addressed by Knudsen

11

Knudsen

Will address Simplot’s

first,

as

it is

not dispositive as Simplot argues.

apportionment argument second, as

it

provides this Court With a

basis t0 uphold the lower court decision Without reaching the merits 0f the application 0f Idaho
§

Code

12-120(3).
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Kenwortb Sales
187,

00.,

supra;

Lunneborg

V.

My Fun Life,

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d

194 (2018). Simplot bears the burden 0f demonstrating a clear abuse 0f

discretion. Berkshire Investments,

LLC V.

Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 80, 2’78 P.3d 943,

950 (2012).
“However, When an award 0f attorney fees depends 0n the interpretation 0f a
statute, the standard of review for statutory interpretation applies.”

00.,

supra (quoting Med. Recovery Selma,

1182, 1183—84 (2018)).

The interpretation

are based 0n a commercial transaction,

Supreme Court
B.

As an

LLC V. Lopez,

is

Ken worth

163 Idaho 281, 283, 411 P.3d

of a statute in this case,

Whether claims

a question 0f law over Which the Idaho

exercises free review. Id.

If this Court Reverses the District

Courtfs' Improper

Judgment, the Attorney Fee Issue

1's

Grant ofSummary

Moot.

Court need not address the attorney fee issue

initial matter, this

judgment in Simplot’s

favor.

Idaho Code §12-120(3) has long been held
fees only for a prevailing party.

Howard

V.

vacated the district court’s decision 0n attorney

2,

_

Idaho

_,

_

P.3d

2020). This Court declined to address

an award

of attorney

district court

fees.

judgment,

it

similarly

See Investor Recovery Fund,

_, 2020 WL 3583817, *11 (Idaho July

an attorney

120(3) because, after a decision on appeal, there

Howard, 141 Idaho at 143, 106 P.3d at

t0 provide for

Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 143, 106 P.3d 465,

469 (2005). Recently, when this Court vacated a

Hopkins,

if it

summary

determines the substantive issues in Knudsen’s favor and reverses

LLC V.

Sales

fee

award under Idaho Code §12-

was n0 prevailing

party. Id. (citing

469). Thus, in the instant matter, if this
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reverses the District Court’s decision granting

summary judgment t0

not address the attorney fee denial below. See also Km'pe Land Co.

Simplot,

V.

it

need

Robertson, 151

Idaho 449, 461, 259 P.3d 595, 607 (2011).

The Fact that Both Parties Requested Attorney Fees does not Remove

CI

the District Courtfs Exercise oijscretjon.

Simplot also argues that because “Knudsen alleged the application of §12-120
and, in particular, §12-120(3)
transaction which
120(3)

.”
.

.

.

fell

.

.

.

[b]0th parties agreed that this

under §12-120(3),”

See Resp.

Brief, p. 34.

was a commercial

“trigger[ing] the application of I.C. §12-

However, just because both parties request

attorney fees pursuant t0 statute does not modify the lower court’s discretion 0n the

grant of attorney fees. Similarly, in this circumstance a court

still

has the duty

t0

appropriately interpret and apply the statute.

This Court has previously held that 0n appeal, Where both parties agree that

an action

arises out of a commercial transaction, the prevailing party

t0 attorney fees

under §12-120(3). See Km'pe Land

00.,

maybe

entitled

151 Idaho at 461, 259 P.3d at

607. However, while the fact that the both parties assert the application 0f §12-120(3)

can be considered as part 0f the exercise 0f discretion, Am. W. Enterprises,
CNPI, LLC, 155 Idaho 746, 755, 316 P.3d 662, 671 (2013),

award

is

automatically appropriate.” Brunobuﬂt, Inc.

222, 457 P.3d 860, 874 (2020). Instead, the

V.

gravamen

it“

does not

Brunobuﬂt,

1120.,

supra

(citing

Lettum'cb

V.

V.

mean such an

Strata, Ina, 166 Idaho 208,
0f the lawsuit

commercial transaction; the commercial transaction must be integral
claims and constitute a basis upon which the party

Inc.

is

must be a

t0 all 0f the

attempting t0 recover.

Key Bank Nat. Ass’n,

141 Idaho 362, 368-
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69,

109 P.3d 1104, 1110-11 (2005)). Thus, While the court can consider the factor that

both parties requested attorney
t0

fees,

that alone does not Vitiate the determination as

whether attorney fees are appropriate.

lee Distn'ct Court was not Required t0 Apportjon Attorney Fees

D.

“0011 tract-based Claims.

Simplot’s

argument that the

“contract-based claims”

brought by Knudsen

is

is

t0

”

District Court

must apportion attorney

fees t0

not correct. As noted below, the only “contract-based claim”

the breach 0f the covenant 0f good faith and fair dealing claim.

However, Simplot did not provide any evidence or basis by Which the District Court
0r this Court could properly apportion attorney fees to the “contract-based” claim.

Indeed, Simplot did not request 0r argue for apportionment in either 0f
fee filings. R., pp. 464-66; R., pp. 554-564. Instead, during oral

the attorney fee request, Simplot simply noted
it’s

— unfortunately, we

costs.

But I’m going

p. 16,

L1 13-17.
It

is

feel that

t0 rely

we have

“[i]f

its

attorney

argument related

the Court feels

it

has

t0

t0 apportion,

a good faith claim for attorneys’ fees and

0n the Court’s judgment in how that’s done.” Tr. 03.13.19,

Simplot’s burden to properly assert the grounds

upon Which

it

requesting an award 0f attorney fees. As this Court has held:

incumbent 0n the moving party to assert the grounds upon Which
seeks an award 0f attorney fees. The district judge is not empowered
t0 award fees 0n a basis not asserted by the moving party. As the
Fourm'er court noted, ‘[t]he opportunity t0 be heard and advance legal
argument on dispositive issues is essential t0 proper procedure.’ 125
Idaho at 791, 874 P.2d at 602. Accordingly, a request for attorney fees
[Ht is

it

should alert the other party t0 the basis upon Which attorney fees are
requested in order that the other party may have a sufficient
opportunity t0 object. Moreover, the district judge cannot award fees, 0n
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is

What he determines t0 be a correct basis, Without providing the
nonmoving party With an opportunity to raise relevant facts and legal
principles in its defense. Regardless 0f Whether the award would have
been proper if the party had requested fees on that basis, it is patently
unfair to deprive the opposing party of an opportunity t0 present
arguments against the award.

Bingbam

V.

Montana Resource

(1999) (citing Fourm'er
1994)); distinguished

V.

Assocs., 133 Idaho 420, 424, 987 P.2d 1035, 1040

Fournjer, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600, 602 (Ct. App.

0n other grounds by BECO Coast.

00., Inc.

V.

J-U-B Engineers,

145 Idaho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008).

Inc.,

Memorandum and Afﬁdavit

Simplot’s initial

01"

Costs

and Attorneys’

Fees,

lacked argument,” analysis, and apportionment 0f the requested fees. R., pp. 464-66.

Even

after

Knudsen

filed his

Objection t0 Defendant’s Request for Costs

AttorneyS’Fees (R, pp. 544-53), noting that “[p]erhaps Simplot neglected
provide analysis because

manner,”13 Simplot

still

it

could not apportion

its

provide anything other than a cursory oral request. R.,
p.

7

duty t0

attorney fees in an appropriate

failed to apportion the requested fees

and Afﬁ'da Vjt 0f Costs and Attorneys’Fees,

its

and

p.

amongst the claims

0r

560 AmendedMemorandum

.

Simplot failed to provide the District Court with a basis t0 apportion attorney
fees

between the various claims. “Where

that qualifies under I.C.

12

§

12-12003)

fees

were not apportioned between a claim

and one that does

not,

n0 fees are

t0

be awarded.”

This Court could hold that Simplot’s failure t0 provide argument or authority for

attorneys’ fees below provides a basis to affirm the District Court’s decision.

its

See Bream

V.

request for
Benscoter,

139 Idaho 364, 369, 79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003). “Where an order 0f the lower court is correct, albeit based
on a different theory than that found dispositive by [the appellate] Court, the lower court order Will be
affirmed.” Smith V. USEV. Properties, LC, 141 Idaho 795, 799, 118 P.3d 127, 131 (2005) (quoting
Sbepbard v. Sbepbaml, 104 Idaho 1, 7, 655 P.2d 895, 901 (1982)).
13

R., p. 550.
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Rockefeller

Brooks

V.

Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 644-45, 39 P.3d 577, 584-85 (2001)

v.

ngray Ranches,

1110.,

(citing

128 Idaho 72, 910 P.2d 744 (1996)).

Thus, because the District Court need not apportion attorney fees between the
various claims and because Simplot failed t0 provide such apportionment, facts, and

argument, no fees are t0 be awarded.

Court Could Hold that the District Court did not Abuse its
Discretion 1'11 Denying Simplot’s Request for an Award ofA ttorney Fees.

E.

T1113

Simplot concedes the District Court’s discretion t0 award or deny
Resp. Brief,

p. 27.

Thus, the issue before this Court

is

See

fees.

Whether the District Court

acted Within the outer bounds of its discretion, “consistently With the legal standards
applicable t0 the specific choices available to
exercise 0f reason.” See

1.

T116

Kenworth Sales

00.,

it

and reached

its

decision by the

165 Idaho at 943, 454 P.3d at 585.

gra vamen ofeacll claim must be a commercial transaction.

For a party t0 recover attorney fees under Idaho Code §12-120(3), the

gravamen

of a claim

LLC V. Bonner City,

must be a commercial

transaction. SJYverI/Vmg at Sandpojnt,

164 Idaho 786, 799, 435 P.3d 1106, 1119 (2019); Stevens

Eyer,

V.

161 Idaho 407, 410, 387 P.3d 75, 78 (2016). Idaho has defined “gravamen” as being
“the material 0r significant part 0f a grievance 0r complaint.”

SIYveerg

at

Sandpozht, LLC, 164 Idaho at 800, 435 P.3d at 1120 (quoting Stevens, supra).

Gravamen

is

analyzed 0n a claim by claim basis.

material or significant part 0f a claim

is

Id.

T0 determine Whether the

a commercial transaction, the Court must

analyze whether a commercial transaction

is

(1)

integral t0 the claim

and

(2)

constitutes the basis of the theory of recovery 0n that claim. Id.

APPELLANT KNUDSEN’S REPLY BRIEF/RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL

-

20

Additionally,

this

analysis requires review of the

transaction between the parties.

relationship

The relationship between the

parties

and the

must have a

commercial purpose and there must be a transaction between the parties.

Id.

“Transaction” has been defined as “the act 0r an instance 0f conducting business 0r
other dealings; esp., the formation, performance, 0r discharge 0f a contract

.

.

.[or]

a

business agreement or exchange” 0r “an exchange 0r transfer 0f goods, service, 0r
funds.” Id.

2.

T129 District

Court bad discretion

t0

determine Whether the

gra vamen ofKnudsen ’S claims was a commercial transaction.

As noted

Knudsen raised four

previously, in the instant matter,

specific causes

0f action: (1) fraud/intentional misrepresentation; (2) promissory estoppel; (3) breach
0f the covenant of good faith
distress. R., pp. 8-11. In

and

fair dealing;

and

(4)

negligent inﬂiction of emotional

denying the attorney fees requested by Simplot, the District

Court noted that “this case just sounds in the — a hybrid nature of fraud, and not in
the nature of contract action that would warrant attorneys’ fees.” Tr. 03.13.19,
L1 2-5.

The

District Court

went on

t0 note that

awardable in this type 0f action.” Tr. 03.13.19,

it

p. 20,

p. 19,

did “not think attorneys’ fees are
L1 13-14. Thus, the District Court

found that the gravamen 0f Knudsen’s claims was not commercial.14

As

set forth below, this

Court could find that the lower court did not abuse

its

discretion because at least half 0f Knudsen’s claims are not grounded in commercial

transactions,

and Simplot provided n0 basis

for the

lower court to apportion attorney

However, the record below does not provide a significant amount 0f detail as t0 what factors the
Court considered in arriving at its decision denying the request for attorney fees. Hence, the suggestion
that remand may be appropriate.
14
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fees. Alternatively, this

Court could remand for additional findings by the District

Court.
T129

a.

Knudsen’s

ﬂaud claim.

fraud

claim

is

tied

clearly

to

Simplot’s

intentional

misrepresentations about his employment. This Court has previously held that
actions brought for breach 0f
transactions. See

Mackay

1064, 1071 (2008);

Oakes

V.

V.

an employment contract are considered commercial

Four Rivers Packing

00.,

145 Idaho 408, 415, 179 P.3d

Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540, 547,

272 P.3d 512, 519 (2012). Additionally, this Court has held that a fraud claim, despite
being a

tort,

may

be considered a commercial transaction under Idaho Code §12-

120(3). See, e.g, Lettum'cb, 141

Trucking, Inc.

V.

G191",

Idaho at 368-69, 109 P.3d at 1110-11 (2005); Bryan

160 Idaho 422, 427, 374 P.3d 585, 590 (2016); Esser E190.

V.

Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Ina, 145 Idaho 912, 921, 188 P.3d 854, 863
(2008).15

However, there are n0 Idaho cases which have held that a fraud claim,

premised upon misrepresentations 0r failures

to disclose in

an employment hiring

context, is a commercial transaction.

Additionally, the cases Which hold that a fraud claim

transaction pursuant t0 LC.

may

be a commercial

§12-120(3) are neither the model of clarity nor

necessarily consistent With other decisions related t0 the application 0f this attorney

15

See also Carrillo

152 Idaho 741, 756, 274 P.3d 1256, 1271 (2012) (“[A1s long
may be entitled t0
attorney fees for claims that are fundamentally related t0 the commercial transaction yet sound in
V.

Boise Tire

as a commercial transaction

is

00., 1120.,

at the center 0f the lawsuit, the prevailing party

tort”)
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fee statute. Thus, there

was n0

bright-line rule 0r test for the District Court t0 apply

regarding Whether the gravamen of a fraud claim can be a commercial transaction.

For example, in Lettunjcb, this Court found that Lettunich’s claims 0f breach
0f contract, breach of covenant 0f good faith

and

fair dealing,

and fraud

arose

all

“Within the commercial context of Lettunich attempting t0 obtain a loan for his
business.” Lettum'clz, 141 Idaho at 369, 109 P.3d at 1111. Focusing on Whether all 0f

the claims arose Within a “commercial context,”16 the Court affirmed the lower court’s

award

of attorney fees

pursuant

to §12-120(3).

In Bryan Trucking, the Plaintiff alleged claims 0f fraud, breach 0f contract,

breach 0f covenant of good faith and

fair dealing,

and unjust enrichment against two

defendants. 160 Idaho at 424, 3’74 P.3d at 588. Plaintiff only alleged a claim of fraud

against defendant

Grier.

Id.

This Court found that despite “no transaction 0r

agreement” between plaintiff and defendant

was an agent
plaintiff,

were

0f another defendant,

3’74

the allegations that defendant Gier

had defrauded the

sufficient t0 qualify as a

160 Idaho at 427,

Grier,

plaintiff,

and owed a duty

to

commercial transaction under LC. §12-120(3).

P.3d at 591.17

In Esser Electric, the parties raised claims and counterclaims related to the

work performed by plaintiff Esser

Electric

on a building used by defendant Lost River

15

This Court later clarified the holding in Lettum'cb, noting that “in that case, the fraud claim was
based upon statements allegedly made to the plaintiff by the defendant’s employee. Thus, the
‘commercial context’ clearly referred t0 conduct 0r transactions between the parties.” Przhtcraf't Press,
Inc. V. Sunnysjde Park Utjls., Ina, 153 Idaho 440, 461, 283 P.3d 757, 778 (2012).

However, many other Idaho cases have held that “a commercial transaction between the parties t0
the lawsuit must form the basis 0f the claim” in order for §12-120(3) t0 apply. See, e.g., Printcraft
Press, Inc.,153 Idaho at 461, 283 P.3d at 778.
17
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for its business. Lost River’s counterclaims included

covenant of good faith and

fair dealing,

breach 0f contract, breach of the

and fraud. In analyzing Whether the fraud

claim was a commercial transaction, the Court commented that wheni
a claim for fraud is integral t0 the commercial transaction between the
parties, attorney fees are awardable under Idaho Code §12-120(3) t0 the
prevailing party 0n that claim. [citations omitted] In this case, the claim
for fraud was integgal to the parties’ commercial transaction because it
arose out 0f the manner in Which Esser Electric billed for its work.

145 Idaho at 921, 188 P.3d at 863 (emphasis added).18

While there are many cases in Which appellate courts have found that various
torts

and claims do not have a commercial transaction as the gravamen

Lettum'cb,

Bryan Trucking, and Esser Elec. have found,

0f the claim,

in those specific cases, that

a fraud claim, intermingled With contract claims, were commercial transactions.
Despite the lack 0f a consistently applied “bright line” test in the cases, Knudsen
agrees that based upon the allegations of his fraud claim and associated Idaho cases,
the employment relationship between

Knudsen and Simplot was a “commercial”

relationship.” Further, Knudsen’s fraud claim appears t0 have arisen during acts

instances of conducting business
contract.

01"

01"

other dealings, including the “formation” of a

See SI'IverI/Vmg at Sandpojnt, LLC, 164 Idaho at 800, 435 P.3d

Thus, based upon SI'Iveerg at Sandpojnt,

LLCS

at 1120.

definition of “transaction,” this

18

This holding in Esser Electric appears t0 reverse the analysis of the issue. Typically, the question is
Whether a commercial transaction “is integral t0 the claim and constitutes the basis 0f the party’s
theory of recovery on that claim.” Sﬂveerngat Sandpojnt, LLC, 164 Idaho at 800, 435 P.3d at 1120.
19

Indeed, there appears t0 be n0 dispute between the parties 0n this initial issue.
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Court could find that a commercial transaction was integral t0 Knudsen’s fraud claim

and provided a basis

for recovery 0f fees.

The promissory estoppe] claim

b.

According to this Court, a claim based upon promissory estoppel

an equitable cause

0f action” in

is

“essentially

Which promissory estoppel serves as a substitute

for

consideration for a contract. SIYverI/Vmg at Sandpojnt, LLC, 164 Idaho at 800, 435

P.3d at 1120. SJ'IverI/Vmg at Sandpojnt,

LLC held

that the nature of a promissory

estoppel claim, as an equitable claim serving as a substitute for consideration,
logically inconsistent

With being a “transaction.”

is

Id.

Based upon the 2019 holding in SIYveerg at Sandpojnt, LLC, a commercial
transaction

is

not integral t0 the promissory estoppel claim such that Simplot was

not entitled t0 fees 0n this claim.
T119

c.

The breach

breach 0f the covenant ofgood faith and fair dealing claim
of the

covenant 0f good faith and

fair

dealing has been

characterized as a breach 0f contract claim. See E5591" E1961, 145 Idaho at 921, 188

P.3d at 863 (“Contrary t0 Esser Electric’s assertion, Lost River’s counterclaim for

breach 0f the implied covenant 0f good faith and
claim.”) (Citing

Bakker

332 (2005)). As a
0f good faith

V.

result, in

fair dealing is a

breach 0f contract

Thunder Sprjng—Warebam, LLC, 141 Idaho

185, 108 P.3d

Esser E1961, this Court held that the breach 0f the covenant

and fair dealing claim “arose out

0f”

the commercial transaction between

the parties and held attorney fees were appropriately awarded as t0 that claim. Id,

145 Idaho at 921, 188 P.3d at 863.
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Given the holding of E5591" Elea, the breach 0f the covenant 0f good faith and
fair dealing

claim has a commercial transaction as an integral part of that claim.
d.

T129 negligent inﬂiction

ofemotjona] distress claim

Knudsen’s negligent inﬂiction 0f emotional distress claim alleges that Simplot
breached a duty not to commit fraud in inducing Knudsen

t0 accept

employment

at

Simplot and that Simplot breached that duty, leading to emotional distress for

Knudsen.

R., pp. 10-11.

Based upon Knudsen’s review, there appear to be n0 appellate

cases holding that a negligent inﬂiction 0f emotional distress tort would be considered

a commercial transaction. While this tort claim does reference the duty of Simplot t0
not commit fraud, there

is

n0 commercial transaction as the gravamen 0f the claim.
a commercial relationship between the parties

Instead, as t0 this claim, there

is solely

Which by

The breach

itself is insufficient.

of duty

and associated emotional

distress

caused by Simplot’s actions lack the commercial transaction necessary for Idaho Code
§12-120(3) t0 apply.

Thus, 0f the four claims brought by Knudsen, two 0f those claims likely have a

commercial transaction as the gravamen 0f the claim (fraud and breach of the
covenant 0f good faith and

fair dealing)

transaction foundation. In rendering
stated “this case just sounds in the
0f contract action that

its

While the other two lack the commercial
ruling regarding fees, the District Court

— a hybrid nature

would warrant attorneys’

of fraud,

and not

in the nature

fees.” Tr. 03.13.19, p. 19, L1 2-5.

Indeed, the lower court could have been more articulate as to

its

that Simplot never analyzed the gravamen 0f each claim,

would be reasonable

it

reasoning, but given

interpret the court’s decision as based in exercising discretion t0 not

t0

award fees given
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the totality of the four claims in relation t0 Idaho Code §12-120(3). This Court could

construe that decision t0 be a reasonable exercise of discretion denying attorney fees

when

only half 0f the claims

failed t0 adequately present

On

fall

within the reach 0f the statute, and where Simplot

an apportionment argument.

comment that

the other hand, this Court could find the District Court’s

it

did “not think attorneys’ fees are awardable in this type of action” to be only

fifty-

percent correct, and therefore an abuse 0f discretion. Perhaps the best course

is to

remand

to the District

Court for more detail regarding

its

determination, unless this

Court upholds the District Court’s decision 0n the alternative ground as asserted in
section IV. D. above.20

V.

As

ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

set forth in his

Opening

Brief,

and remand

should this Court vacate the

Judgmentin

Simplot’s favor

remand the

issue of fees 0n appeal to the District Court

this case in

Amended

Whole or in part, then

when

it

it

should

determines the

prevailing party.

If,

this

0n the other hand, summary judgment in Simplot’s favor

is

affirmed, then

Court should uphold the lower court’s exercise of discretion in light of the mixed

nature 0f the claims (half 0f the claims apparently commercial transactions, the other
half not) and Simplot’s failure to apportion its fees between the claims.

2°

See discussion, supra, regarding apportionment

0f fees

and the lack

of support for the same.
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CONCLUSION

VI.

The
permitted

District Court incorrectly found facts in Simplot’s favor

it

t0 dismiss

Knudsen’s claims on summary judgment erroneously. This

Court should vacate the Court’s
trial

Which in turn

Amended Judgment and remand

the case for jury

regarding Knudsen’s claims against Simplot. In turn, the Court should remand

the issue of fees (below and 0n appeal) to the District to determine once a prevailing

party has been determined.

DATED this 20th dav of August. 2020
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ADDENDUM
Investor Recovery Fund,

3583817, *11 (Idaho July

LLC V.
2,

Hopkins,

Idaho

,

P.3d

,

2020

WL

2020)
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LLC

Investor Recovery Fund,

2020

Hopkins, 467 P.3d 406 (2020)

v.

WL 3583817

467 P.3d 406
Supreme Court 0f Idaho,
Boise, February

Reversed, vacated, and remanded.

2020 Term.
*409 Appeal from the

INVESTOR RECOVERY FUND,

LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,
V.

Randall H.

HOPKINS, an individual;

Hopkins Financial

Ada

County. Richard D.

afﬁrmed

in part

amended judgment

is

and reversed
vacated, and

remanded.

Law Firms

Angstman Johnson,

Respondents-Cross Appellants,

Boise, for appellant. Wyatt B. Johnson

argued.

and

are

in part, the district court’s
is

Court of the Fourth Judicial

District Judge.

Attorneys and

Services, Inc.,

District

State of Idaho,

district court’s rulings are

the case

an Idaho corporation, Defendants-

Holland

whose true names

I-V,

Greenwood,

The

Brian Murphy, an individual;

Does

District of the

&

Hart,

PLLC,

Boise,

Robert

for respondents.

Faucher argued.

unknown, Defendants.
SUBSTITUTE OPINION.

Docket Nos. 46247
|

Opinion

Filed: July 2,

2020

THE COURT’S PRIOR OPINION DATED APRIL
2020, IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN.

Synopsis

Background: Investors brought fraud action against ﬁnancial
services

ﬁrm and

jury

Justice.

investment fund principals arising out of

loss of investments. After grant
trial

BRODY,

of summaryjudgment to ﬁrm,

was held, and the Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada

County, Richard D. Greenwood,

J.,

entered directed verdict

for principals. Investors appealed.

“‘1

This

review

standard

of

considering a directed verdict in a fraud

by

case

when

addresses

assignee of six claims held

fund). Randall

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Brody,

J.,

held

the

applicable

nondisclosure case. Investor Recovery Fund,

their investments in the

by

of

whether

investment

fund

Hopkins Northwest Fund,

alleged

nondisclosures were proximate cause of claimed losses was

its

discretion in excluding securities

expert's testimony as to materiality of alleged nondisclosures;

ﬁmd’s principals individually

LLC

(the

The

individual

for the purposes

of

Hopkins Financial and
(collectively,

Hopkins

The fund declared a moratorium on redemptions

in 2008, preventing investors

from taking

of the fund. The individual investors

when

and

Recovery

asserting a collective claim against

Associates).

court acted within

the
lost

Hopkins and Brian Murphy were the principals

investors formed Investor

the

jury question;

trial

is

who

of the fund, and together they owned and managed Hopkins

that:

principals'

LLC

individual investors

Financial Services, Inc. (Hopkins Financial).
issue

20,

their

lost their

money

out

investments

the fund declared bankruptcy six years later. Investor

Recovery sued Hopkins Associates, asserting claims of fraud
there

was no evidence

that individual

investors in fund

by nondisclosure. The

district court

granted the principals’

reasonably believed that their interactions with principals

motion for a directed verdict

were on behalf of ﬁnancial services ﬁrm instead of on behalf

concluding that Investor Recovery did not prove that the

of fund, as would be required for investors' Vicarious
claim against

Reuters.

No

seven days of

trial,

individual investors’ losses were causally connected to the
principals’ alleged nondisclosures.

ﬁrm based on agency theory.

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson

liability

after

claim to original U.S.

Government Works.

We

reverse the district

1

Investor Recovery Fund,

2020

LLC

v.

Hopkins, 467 P.3d 406 (2020)

WL 3583817

court’s directed verdict, vacate the judgment,

and remand the

prior to investing in the fund.

redemption

case for further proceedings.

rights.

The

PPM

detailed investors’

The crux of the redemption policy allowed

debenture holders to redeem their debentures within 121
days, or earlier,
I.

upon providing written notice

Debenture holders” redemption

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

to the

ﬁmd’s

right to declare a

rights,

to the fund.

however, were subject

“moratorium” on redemption

requests to preserve the fund’s liquidity. According to the

A. Factual background.

PPM,

the fund

was

moratorium

entitled to declare a

if the

number of redemptions gave management concerns about
1.

Investor Recovery, the individual investors, and the

fund

to issue a

Investor Recovery

debenture holders

assignee

of six claims from

lost all or part

of their investments in

the

is

who

the fund: Carol Snyder, Carol Snyder as trustee for the

Hees Family
Bill

the fund’s liquidity or if

Pugh

Trust, Kellie

Pugh (Carol Snyder’s

moratorium

Van

Murphy

needed

of debentures. The relevant portion

in this case

allowed management to declare a

if:

under [the PPM] to cause Management ofthe [fund]

and

to

have

concern for the liquidity of the [fund] and parity treatment

Elizabeth Erickson (collectively, the “individual investors”).

Randall Hopkins and Brian

series

it

Sufﬁcient debenture holders give notice of redemption

daughter),

(Kellie Pugh’s husband), Larry Erickson,

new

PPM

of the

management determined

among

all

debenture holders[.]

“Hopkins

(together,

and Murphy”) own and operate Hopkins Financial. Hopkins
is

CPA,

the president and majority owner. Murphy, a

the controller

is

number of investment

Hopkins

funds, including the

Northwest Fund, LLC, the fund

From

the fund’s inception in

2000 through the middle of

2007, the fund produced consistent high-yield returns. The
fund’s returns started to decline towards the end of 2007.

at issue in this case.

In

addition to their roles at Hopkins Financial, Hopkins and

Murphy

2008 Moratorium

and a minority owner. In 2007, Hopkins

Financial acted as an afﬁliate and contract placement manager
for a

2.

Hopkins

attributed the drop in yield to a default in

the fund’s largest loans (the “Hunter’s Point loan”).

served as the fund’s principals.

one of

The fund

also experienced a general increase in loan delinquency at the

The fund operated by

raising capital

from

investors,

most of

whom were individuals. The fund pooled its capital, investing
in loans secured

were not

by

real estate to high—risk

eligible to receive loans

borrowers

who

from *410 banks. Because

end of 2007. The fund’s ﬁnancial troubles

2008 coincided with a

larger, national

The “Great Recession” impacted
Valley and across the country.

As

in late

2007 and

economic downturn.

real estate in the Treasure

a result, real estate prices in

Idaho plummeted in 2008.

of the risky nature of the loans, the fund charged borrowers
high interest

The fund

rates,

which

in turn

produced high yield

returns.

In February 2008, lower yields and recent developments in
distributed the resulting earned interest in proﬁts to

the Hunter’s Point loan spurred
its

a special meeting for
Individuals investing in the fund received “debentures.”

Holding a debenture

publicly traded, and there
Further, the debentures

was no private market for their sale.

all

On

February

debenture holders,

special meeting that could directly affect [their] investment in
[the fund].”

were not registered with the Securities

The only way

investors could leave the fund with

or a portion of their debenture investment

was through a

On February 26, 2008, Charley Williams—an investor who is
not a party to this lawsuit—sent an email to

suspended in

The fund was governed by a

memorandum (PPM). Each

investor

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson

placement

private

was issued

Reuters.

No

the

Murphy inquiring

about the status of a pending redemption. In response,

Murphy wrote

“redemption” process.

“‘2

debenture holders.

an investor to a pro-rata share

and Exchange Commission or the Idaho Department of
Finance.

all

25, 2008, Hopkins sent a letter to

to call

requesting their presence at an “urgent, important[,] and
entitled

of the fund’s operating proﬁt. The debentures were not

all

Hopkins and Murphy

investors monthly.

that, “I

[the fund]

believe that

all

redemptions will be

on 02-28-08.” This information was

not shared with any other investors, and Williams submitted

PPM

claim to original U.S.

Government Works.

2
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a redemption request withdrawing

all

following day. The fund paid Williams in

money

of his

the

between August and December of 2007. These individual

Murphy

investors testiﬁed that

full.

failed to disclose that the

fund was in a position to declare a moratorium. Crucially,

The

special meeting occurred

on February

2008

29,

(the

“Leap Day meeting”). Carol Snyder, Kellie Pugh, and
Betsy Erickson attended the meeting. Betsy Erickson and

Pugh updated

Kellie

their

evening. Hopkins and

spouses on the meeting later that

Murphy

Murphy also

fund’s delinquent

loans—was

to

constituted 72 percent of the

in judicial foreclosure. Further,

the PowerPoint disclosed that one-third of the fund’s current

loans were not performing, meaning that they were
thirty

moratorium

to call a

at

any time,

in

take home. Hopkins and Murphy’s presentation disclosed that

loan—Which

ﬁmd

that,

ﬁmd’s dwindling

they would have redeemed their debentures immediately.

B. Procedural background.

distributed a thirty-ﬁve

page copy of the PowerPoint presentation for investors

the Hunter’s Point

liquidity allowed the

that the

presided over the meeting,

walking through a PowerPoint presentation with investors
attendance. Hopkins and

each of these three individual investors also testiﬁed

had Murphy raised the possibility

more than

for the

Investor Recovery subsequently ﬁled a complaint against

Hopkins Associates,

fraud

alleging

upon each of

individual investors, fraudulent transfers

Murphy, vicarious

liability for

the

by Hopkins and

Hopkins Financial, and

amended

conspiracy. Investor Recovery later

days past due.

was organized

In August 2014, Investor Recovery

purpose of pursuing a claim against Hopkins Associates.

civil

complaint,

its

adding a claim for punitive damages.

During the Leap
discussed

also

Day

the

Hopkins and Murphy

meeting,

potential

for

PowerPoint presentation included a
Redemptions/Potential *411

a

The

moratorium.

full slide titled,

“Investor

Moratorium,” and stated

that,

“should desired redemption requests exceed [the fund]’s
available cash

ﬁmd]

ﬂow to pay those requests, this may cause

to declare

[the

a moratorium.” This information essentially

restated the fund’s

moratorium policy contained

in the

PPM.

After three years of litigation, the district court granted
partial

summary judgment, dismissing Hopkins

as a defendant.

The

district court

concluded

Financial
outside

that,

of allegations that Hopkins and Murphy aided and assisted

Hopkins Financial and other afﬁliated

entities in soliciting

investment, Investor Recovery failed to produce speciﬁc

evidence making Hopkins Financial liable for the alleged torts

of Hopkins and Murphy.

Immediately following the Leap

Day

meeting, redemption

requests spiked. Throughout the spring and
the fund’s

summer of 2008,

economic condition continued

to decline.

The

fund eventually declared a moratorium on September

Before

district
8,

2008. For those redemption requests submitted after the Leap

Day

meeting, only two redemption requests received their

full

investment back. The fund never recovered from the

trial,

Hopkins and Murphy ﬁled a motion

Investor Recovery’s expert witness, R.

on

court held a hearing

Hopkins and Murphy’s motion

Wayne

the matter,

to

exclude

Klein.

The

and granted

to exclude Klein.

The

district

court concluded that Klein’s opinions were not relevant and

would not aid the jury

at trial.

moratorium, and failed to honor any redemption requests after
calling the

The jury

September 2008 moratorium.

issues

“‘3

In 2014, the fund declared bankruptcy.

approved bankruptcy plan
nothing.
investors

left

debenture

The fund’s

holders

with

in seven days

The individual investors were among the fund’s

who

The

lost the

The

remaining balance of their debenture
investors testiﬁed that their

individual

trial

2018. The only remaining

of

after

trial,

its

district court

verdict for

civil

case-in-chief

which, Hopkins and

Murphy

for a directed verdict pursuant to I.R.C.P.

50(3).

granted the motion and entered a directed

Hopkins and Murphy. The

that Investor

collective losses totaled $1.4 million.

4,

were fraud by nondisclosure and

conspiracy. Investor Recovery completed

moved

investments.

began on June

trial

at

Recovery

failed to

district court

held

prove that the alleged

nondisclosures caused the individual investors’ injuryithat
is,

caused them not to submit redemption requests. The

district court

3.

At

The

alleged nondisclosures

trial,

met with Murphy,

that,

even

if

Hopkins and Murphy

failed to disclose that conditions for a

Carol Snyder, Larry Erickson, and Bill Pugh testiﬁed

that they

reasoned

in the

moratorium existed

individual meetings with investors, the managers

Day
when the

disclosed the possibility of a moratorium in the Leap
in person or over the phone,

meeting. The district court further concluded that
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individual investors failed to submit redemption requests,

even

Hopkins and Murphy disclosed the alleged

after

nondisclosed

fact, the

fraud and injury

was

causal connection between the alleged

severed.

The

district court

subsequently

136 Idaho

A directed verdict is only

892, 42 P.3d at 685).

at

proper where the evidence

so clear that

is

reasonable

all

minds could only reach one conclusion—that the moving
party should prevail. Id.

entered a ﬁnal judgment on July 2, 201 8. Investor Recovery
Investor Recovery asserted a fraud

appealed.

at

On

July 16, 2018, Hopkins Associates ﬁled a motion for

Code

attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho

12-120(3) and 12-121.

*412

awarding any attorney

fees,

12-120(3)

12-121

nor

memorandum

a

arguing that neither section

apply.

decision

sections

Investor Recovery opposed

The

issued

court

district

and order awarding Hopkins

To

trial.

prevail,

it

convincing evidence,

needed

by nondisclosure claim

(1) there

that:

(2) the individual investors relied

by clear and
was a nondisclosure;

prove,

to

upon Hopkins Associates’

nondisclosure; (3) the individual investors’

reliance

was

material to the transaction; and (4) the individual investors

were damaged
Watts

as a proximate result of the nondisclosure.

131 Idaho 616, 619, 962 P.2d 387, 390

Krebs,

v.

Associates a fraction of the fees sought. The district court

(1998); see also Frontier Dev. Grp.,

held that the reduced award was appropriate given duplicative

Idaho 589, 594, 338 P.3d 1193, 1198 (2014) (“Each ofthe

efforts in the litigation,

and found

that only

one third of the

claims constituted commercial transactions under Idaho
section 12-120(3).

The

district court

entered an

Code

amended

judgment on September 27, 2018. Hopkins Associates crossappealed the

district court’s

order and award of attorney fees,

and Investor Recovery also challenged the
attorney fee award in an

amended

district court’s

To

evidence.”).

arise

(1) there is a

if:

duty to disclose

may

ﬁduciary or similar relation of

trust

and conﬁdence between the two

contract

A. The district court erred in entering a directed verdict

parties; (2)

it is

known by one
outcome

necessary to

party and not the other

that if the mistake

would be voidable, and,

Press, Inc.

v.

Sunnyside Park

know

Utils.,

disclose

is

a

the fact. Printcraft

Ina, 153 Idaho 440,

mixed question of law and

circumstances, if proved,

Standard 0f Review

a duty to disclose

**4 “When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for
conduct an independent review of

makes
proved

is

1d.

is

a duty to

Whether the

to give rise to

But once the court

whether those circumstances were

that determination,
is

fact. Id.

would be sufﬁcient

a matter of law.

so

defendant

further, that the

that the plaintiff does not

is

were mutual the

453, 283 P.3d 757, 770 (2012). Whether there

Hopkins and Murphy.

we

A

prevent a partial statement ofthe facts from being misleading;

appeal.

ANALYSIS

a directed verdict,

must be a

Van Engelen, 153 Idaho

v.

648, 657, 289 P.3d 50, 59 (2012).

knows

1.

Caravella, 157

establish a nondisclosure, there

duty to disclose. Wash. Fed. Sav.

or (3) a fact

for

v.

elements of fraud must be established by clear and convincing

vital to the

II.

LLC,

a question of fact.

Id.

the evidence and do not defer to the ﬁndings of the trial
court.” Sallaz

990 (2016)

v.

Rice,

(citing

161 Idaho 223, 226, 384 P.3d 987,

Gillingham Consllc, Inc.

v.

Newby-Wiggins

Constn, Ina, 136 Idaho 887, 891, 42 P.3d 680, 684 (2002)).

2.

The

district court

used the wrong standard in entering

a directed verdict.

Admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and drawing
every reasonable inference most favorably to the opposing
party,

we must

determine whether there exists substantial

evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury.

ﬁnding of substantial evidence does not require

Id.

A

that the

evidence be uncontradicted, or even that we ﬁnd it persuasive.
1d. Further,

it

does not require that

we reweigh

the evidence

Before addressing the merits of the

we

verdict decision,

review.

The standard of review

is

because

it,

standard of

more than just

taking up space in appellate briefs.
is critical

district court’s directed

the appropriate

clarify

boilerplate

The standard of review

in effect, operates as the

microscope

through which an appellate court examines whether there was

*413

we

examining

or consider the credibility 0f witnesses. Id. Rather, a ﬁnding

error in a proceeding. In

of substantial evidence “only requires that the evidence be of

whether the

district court correctly

sufﬁcient quality and probative value that reasonable minds

in favor of

Hopkins and Murphy. Our case law makes

could conclude that a verdict in favor of the party against

clear that

whom the motion is made

evidence. Before

is proper.” Id. (quoting Gillingham,
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to articulate the correct evidentiary standard to

be applied.

This Court exercises free review over questions ofevidentiary
standards. Turner

v.

Turner, 155 Idaho 819, 823,

Idaho

an issue on appeal,

“litigants’ failure to address the

Investor Recovery produced substantial evidence of

3.

legal question

226, 384 P.3d at 990.

at

317 P.3d

we recognize that neither party raised

716, 720 (2013). While
this as

substantial evidence to submit the case to the jury. Sallaz, 161

from the

does not render

right perspective

causation.

us powerless to work the problem out properly.” Williams-

Guice

Bd. ofEduc. 0f City 0f Chicago, 45 F.3d 161, 164

v.

The causation element
issue in this appeal. In

submission to erroneous legal concepts even though none of

verdict, the district court

law below.” Empire Life

the parties declaimed the applicable
Ins. C0.

ofAm.

v.

Valdak Corp, 468 F.2d 330, 334 (5th

1972). In this case,

own

where

we

are called

upon

independent analysis of the evidence,

standard applied
standard. See

by

Cir.

to

conduct our

we

address the

and apply the correct

the district court

its

only element of fraud

the

is

(7th Cir. 1995). “Appellate review does not consist of supine

analysis announcing the directed

concluded that Investor Recovery

established, for the purposes of the motion, that

Murphy had

a duty to disclose, and that there were material

nondisclosures. In addressing the nondisclosure element, the
district

concluded that the fund failed

problems

that stretched

at trial,

Investor Recovery needed to prove

all

elements of its fraud claim by clear and convincing evidence.
Watts, 131 Idaho at 619,

962 P.2d

at

390. However, to survive

a motion for a directed verdict, Investor Recovery needed

produce substantial evidence of the elements in dispute.

Jordan

v.

t0 disclose liquidity

from the middle of 2007 through

of2007 The district court

a moratorium starting in the middle

to

Hopkins and

September 20087meaning that the fund had a right to declare

id.

“‘5 To prevail

at

Hunter, 124 Idaho 899, 907, 865 P.2d 990, 998 (Ct.

App. 1993); see also April Beguesse,

Inc.

v.

Rammell, 156

.

further concluded that the individual investors failed to

make

redemption requests aﬁer the fund disclosed the possibility

of a moratorium in the Leap
held
to

that,

Day

meeting. The district court

because the individual investors had the opportunity

redeem based on the Leap Day meeting information, and

did not, a jury could not conclude that the nondisclosures

caused their

breaking the chain of causal connection. To

loss,

Idaho 500, 509-10, 328 P.3d 480, 489-90 (2014) (holding that

be clear, the district court based

when reviewing

on the element of causation alone. The Leap Day meeting was

this

to

a directed verdict decision in a fraud claim,

Court determines whether there was sufﬁcient evidence

When

submit the claim to the jury).

entered the directed verdict,

directed verdict decision

critical to its analysis.

the district court

concluded that no jury could

it

its

On

*414

appeal, Investor Recovery asserts that although

conclude by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged

some

nondisclosures caused the investors’ losses:

and the materials provided, these were not

were made during

disclosures

the

Leap Day meeting
sufficient to break

the causal chain of connection. Rather, Investor

The

essential element

of the claim

is

that the nondisclosure

argues

be the cause of the

loss,

and here

it is

myﬁnding

nondisclosures.

of the management’s

moratorium during the

fall

is

a

loss.

causation element

We

evident from this statement that the district court

standard rather than the substantial evidence standard that

used to evaluate a motion for directed verdict. See

Bolt

v.

124 Idaho

at

907,

865 P.2d

at

998;

trial

would be

proper.

court erred using a clear and

we

starting in the

middle

Investor Recovery introduced Hopkins’ testimony from a
prior bankruptcy proceeding, in

was a period of time mid
the moratorium

cash
this error,

Investor Recovery produced evidence that

of 2007 and continuing into February 2008. Speciﬁcally,

convincing evidentiary standard to review the sufﬁciency

of the evidence). Notwithstanding

at trial.

ﬁmd experienced liquidity concerns

see also

Inﬂuence, Ina, 333 Or. 572, 43 P.3d 425, 427-29

(2002) (holding that the

mind could

begin by examining the evidence of nondisclosure

produced
the

Jordan,

agree that a reasonable

Recovery
fraudulent

conclude that a verdict in favor of Investor Recovery on the

erroneously employed the clear and convincing evidence

is

We

further

and winter of 2007 up through

February of 2008 caused the
It

ability to call

were

disclosures

these

that a

jury could not conclude by clear and convincing evidence
that the nondisclosure

that

conduct an

[in

[sic]

which he

of [2007]

to

testiﬁed: “There

when we

declared

2008] of navigating a restriction on

ﬂow and just working with people on an individual
we felt we could, to navigate the storm up until

basis, as

independent review of the

district court’s directed verdict

decision to determine whether Investor Recovery presented

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson
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loani

coincided with delinquency in the Hunter’s Point
the fund’s largest loan. Thus, Investor

Recovery produced

ﬂow

evidence that the fund experienced cash

Murphy

2007, causing Hopkins and

on an individual basis

requests to protect cash

ﬂow, or

work With

to

to mitigate the

investors

number of redemption

liquidity.

individual investors had a right to

problems in

Under

redeem

the

PPM,

their debentures

a moratorium.” Put differently, projecting that a moratorium
will occur in

a different message in substance

is

should the conditions

arise.

Thus,

we rej ect the district court’s
Day meeting and

conclusion that the information in the Leap

PowerPoint sufﬁciently revealed the alleged nondisclosures
to

break the chain of causation.

management’s right to call a moratorium. One ofthe

subj ect to

conditions under which

was “concern

management could call a moratorium

for the liquidity of the [fund].” Accordingly,

A

losses

middle of 2007, the fund had concerns about

the

management

its

liquidity,

the right to declare a moratorium at

any

time.

liquidity concerns directly relate to

investors,

who met

times during this

The individual

with Murphy individually

at different

time period, testiﬁed that Murphy did

critical

Hopkins and

not a plaintiff to this

is

email from

fund.

the

in

Murphy

The day

after

he received the

projecting that the fund

was going

—Wi11iams submitted
received

a redemption request in

full.

payment on a redemption

of the

had they known

a moratorium

call

have redeemed immediately. The Leap

Day

last investors to

receive full

that the

they would

earlier,

Williams

of his money back from the fund, and was one

all

request before the September 2008 moratorium.

fund was in a position to

to

suspend redemptions in two days—or declare a moratorium

management could call a moratorium under the PPM.
the individual investors testiﬁed that,

*415

he held the same debentures as the individual

not disclose that the fund’s liquidity had reached a point where
Further,

actions

email demonstrate this

after receiving the

connection. Although Williams

investors

the individual investors’ nondisclosure claims.

that

claimed by Investor Recovery. Williams’

day

lawsuit,

“‘6 The fund’s early

mind could conclude

reasonable

Murphy’s nondisclosures were the proximate cause of the

Investor Recovery produced evidence that, starting in the

giving

two days

and scope than the mere possibility a moratorium could occur

meeting did not

In sum, the Williams email

mere

is

evidence that disclosing the

Day

of a moratorium during the Leap

possibility

meeting was not an accurate picture of the fund’s stark

sever the chain of causation.

ﬁnancial outlook, and did not sufficiently reveal the alleged

Charley Williams’ testimony
trial,

is critical to

our analysis. At

Williams—a former debenture holder who

is

not a

party to this case—testiﬁed about an email exchange between

himself and

Murphy

that took place three

days before the

Leap Day meeting. Williams emailed Murphy to inquire about
a pending redemption request that was coming due in early

March. Murphy replied:

“I believe that all

redemptions will

nondisclosure to sever the causal connection.

mind could have concluded that

A

reasonable

the fund’s failure to disclose

an imminent moratoﬁum—like the disclosure in the Williams

emailicaused the individual
that Investor

we hold

investors’ losses. Thus,

Recovery demonstrated substantial evidence of

causation to survive a directed verdict. Sallaz, 161 Idaho at

226, 384, 384 P.3d 987 P.3 at 990.

be suspended in [the fund] on 02-28-08. The size of the
redemption

is

not the issue

it is

amount of

the cumulative

redemptions and cash availability.”

Hopkins Associates argues
Bryant Motors,

800 P.2d 683

The information

in the

Williams email

the information included in the
the Williams email,

is

not the same as

Leap Day PowerPoint. In

Murphy, who was the fund’s

controller,

estimated that the fund would declare a moratorium in two
days,

meaning

existed.

the

line

of “holder” cases

support the district court’s causation conclusion.

Associates argues that the alleged

amount

the alleged nondisclosure to

of causation.

We

disagree.

harm

is

Hopkins

too speculative to

to substantial evidence

Both Bryant Motors and the

line

key piece of evidence: proofthat had an alleged nondisclosure

the moratorium

PPM. The urgency and imminence

a thirty-ﬁve slide PowerPoint stating

that,

may

“should desired

ﬂow

cause [the fund] to declare

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson

Reuters.

No

been disclosed, the

plaintiff’s

Here, the Williams email

is

harm could have been avoided.

that proof.

line in

redemption requests exceed [the fund]’s available cash

pay those requests, this

Slates Ins. C0., 118 Idaho 796,

information in the PowerPoint

of the Williams email contrasts starkly with one

to

Am.

App. 1990), and a

of holder cases cited by Hopkins Associates were missing a

more than a restatement of

policy outlined in the

v.

Court of Appeals decision,

moratorium presently

that conditions for a

Conversely,

offered nothing

Inc.

(Ct.

that a

“‘7 In Bryant Motors, the
that Noram

plaintiff

American Diesel,

received payment from a school

claim to original U.S.

Government Works.
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Inc. failed to disclose that
district.
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800 P.2d

at 684. Together, the

for the school district. Id. In

two

its

entities built

fraud claim, Bryant Motors

alleged that, as a consequence of

was delayed

it

in asserting

its

Noram’s nondisclosure,

legal rights. 1d. at 800,

P.2d at 687. Bryant Motors argued that
action to protect

know

Noram

that

its

district court

damages had

of Appeals afﬁrmed the

Supp. 2d

at

514

at

934; see also Citigroup, 980

(“Plaintiffs raise

common law

claims of

negligent misrepresentation and fraud that take the form or

what are referred

to as ‘holder’ claims[.]”). Critics argue

that holder claims “lack essential elements of fraudulent

and

negligent misrepresentation claims and thus are categorically

without merit.” McDermott, supra, at 948. In particular,

for Bryant Motors, but the

holder claims are attacked for their incomplete account of the

800 P.2d

The Idaho Court

at 685.

district court,

when

holding that

claim

to the nondisclosure, the plaintiff’s
its

F.

McDermott, supra,

it

at 800,

fails. 1d.

of Appeals noted

analysis, the Court

causal relationship between the defendant’s misconduct and
the allegedly resultant damages.

McDermott, supra,

Hopkins Associates argues

many

at

942.

a

prove that his inaction was causally connected

687. In

claims.

district.

granted the defendant’s motion notwithstanding

plaintiff cannot

at

800

would have taken

legal rights to avoid

the verdict. Id. at 798,

800 P.2d

it

received a check from the school

The jury returned a verdict

Id.

a school bus

claims
to

when

that

courts dismiss holder

the plaintiff’s claims are too speculative or fail

prove causation. See Arent

v.

Distrib. Sell, Ina,

975 F.2d

had Noram instantaneously informed Bryant Motors of

1370, 1372 (8th Cir. 1992) (afﬁrming the dismissal ofaholder

its

conduct, Bryant Motors could have taken action sooner.

claim because the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a valueless

Id.

However, the court found

that

that “there is

no indication

as to

company

rather than the defendant’s nondisclosure);

WM
WL

what [Bryant Motors’] endeavors would have been or what

High ﬁeld Fund

they would have yielded[.]” Id. The Court of Appeals further

6788466,

held that the record on appeal did not contain substantial

the plaintiff’s

evidence, other than conjecture and speculation, from which

information and

a jury could properly support a verdict for Bryant Motors.

nondisclosure). While Investor Recovery’s claims are akin

Id.

at *2,

v.

O’Hanlon, N0. 04-3423, 2005

*13 (E.D. Pa.

May

13,

2005) (holding that

damages resulted from disclosures of accurate
its

effect

on the market rather than the alleged

to holder claims, the facts supporting Investor

Here, the record

on appeal does contain

substantial evidence

from which a reasonable mind could conclude
fund’s nondisclosures caused the losses.

that the

The Williams email

claim cases cited by Hopkins Associates.
the Williams email

demonstrates what a similarly situated investor did in the

situated investor avoided the

investors

was not disclosed

to

As noted

harm

alleged

when given nondisclosed

by

the individual

information. Thus, this

same speculation malady exhibited in

the rest of the investors in the fund. Further, the evidence

case does not suffer the

indicates that such a disclosure allowed at least one investor,

holder claims.

Williams, to avoid losses. Thus, the Williams email

verdict and vacate the district court’s judgment.

is

the type

above,

concrete evidence that a similarly

is

wake of

receiving information that

Recovery’s

claims are not speculative like those exhibited in the holder

As such, we reverse the district court’s directed

of evidence that the Court oprpeals concluded was missing
in

Bryant Motors. As such,

we do

not

ﬁnd Bryant Motors
B.

persuasive in this case.

The

district court did not

excluding R.

Hopkins Associates also argues
jurisdictions’ analyses

that federal

and

district

A

holder claim

is

plaintiff investor alleges that after

1.

an action

in

which the

he retained, rather than

**8

We review the district court’s decision to exclude expert

testimony for abuse of discretion. Thurston Enters., Inc.

is

defendant provided or neglected to reveal about the issuer,

a manifest abuse of the

trial

the price of his securities substantially dropped.
T.

McDermott,
in

Delaware and Beyond?, 41 Del.

934 (2017); see
F.

Edward

*416 Holder Claims- Potential Causes 0f

AHW

Inv.

Pis‘hip

v.

J.

Corp. L. 933,

Citigroup Ina, 980

Supp. 2d 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Holder claims are

asserted as

common law fraud or negligent misrepresentation

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson
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No

v.

Safeguard Bus. Sys. Ina, 164 Idaho 709, 716, 435 P.3d
489, 496 (2019). Error

Action

discretion in

Standard of Review

because of material misinformation the

sold, his security

its

on causation. Hopkins Associates

equate Investor Recovery’s fraud by nondisclosure claims
to holder claims.

abuse

Klein’s testimony.

sister state

of “holder claims” support the

court’s directed verdict

Wayne

“disregarded unless the ruling
court’s discretion

substantial right of the party.” 1d. (quoting

Valley Reg’l

Med.

820-21 (2000)).

Perry

is

affects a
v.

Magic

Ctr, 134 Idaho 46, 50-51, 995 P.2d 816,

When reviewing for abuse

Court considers whether the
as

and

one of discretion,

trial

of discretion,

this

court (1) perceived the issue

(2) acted within the outer

boundaries of

that discretion, (3) acted consistently with the legal standards

claim to original U.S.
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applicable to the speciﬁc choices available to

reached

decision

its

My Fun Life,

by an

exercise of reason.

it,

and

(4)

Lurmeborg

v.

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 195 (2018).

However, the

industry.

from testifying on materiality on relevance grounds, rather the
district court

held that Klein would not help the

determining materiality. The

The

admissibility of expert testimony

is

governed by Idaho

did not preclude Klein

district court

jury

district court

own

conclusions
”

about What was going on and What was materia

Rule of Evidence 702, which provides:

of fact in

concluded that “a

completely capable of reaching their

is

trier

without

Klein’s testimony. Thus, the district court precluded Klein’s

A witness who is qualiﬁed as an expert by knowledge, skill,

testimony on materiality under I.R.E. 702 rather than I.R.E.

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of

401. Accordingly,

an opinion or otherwise

if the expert’s scientiﬁc, technical,

or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to

we

review the

district court’s I.R.E.

702

ruling for an abuse of discretion. Thurston Enters., 164 Idaho
at 716,

435 P.3d

496.

at

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
I.R.E. 702.

**9

Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Evidence, an expert

witnesses

2.

The

district court did not err in ruling that Klein’s

may

knowledge

common

securities law, controls

Investor Recovery contends that the district court abused
discretion in excluding Klein’s expert testimony

From

the record,

it

is

undisputed that Klein

expert. Notwithstanding his

Recovery sought

securities

is

from

its

trial.

a securities

expertise, Investor

testimony for a broader

t0 introduce his

range of topics, including Hopkins and Murphy’s duty to

Will help the trier

of fact

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
I.R.E. 702. Idaho’s

testimony would not assist the jury.

form of an opinion or otherwise

testify in the

specialized

if his

law, rather than federal or state

whether an alleged nondisclosure

material. See Watts, 131 Idaho at 619-20,

The

A

620, 962 P.2d at 391.

material if “a reasonable

at

is

390-91.

both objective and subjective.

test for materiality is

Id. at

962 P.2d

nondisclosure

man would

is

objectively

attach importance to

its

existence or nonexistence in deterring his choice of action
in the transaction in question,”

and subjectively material

if

and

“the

maker of the representation knows or has reason to know

extreme deviations under securities laws to justify an award of

that

its

punitive damages. In granting Hopkins and Murphy’s motion

important in determining his choice of action.”

disclose, the materiality of their alleged nondisclosures,

to

exclude Klein, the

district court

testifying in four areas: (1) securities

*417 industry’s duty to

Klein’s testimony

law fraud,

law and the

securities

district court

held that, because

would not bear on the elements of common

his testimony

would not

is

likely to regard the matter as
Id.

precluded Klein from

disclose; (2) materiality; (3) reliance;

and (4) punitive damages. The

recipient regards or

aid the jury in reaching

its

decision on the issues before them.

The

district court

Klein’s testimony.

did not abuse

its

discretion in excluding

The trial court determines whether to admit

or refuse an expert’s testimony. State

Perry, 139 Idaho 520,

v.

523, 81 P.3d 1230, 1233 (2003). Thus, the district court acted

within the boundaries of its discretion in determining that the

proposed testimony would not help the jury determine the
issue of materiality. Further, the district court acted Within the

Crucially,

on appeal, Investor Recovery

to the issue

of materiality. Investor Recovery argues that the

district court

because

it

limits its challenge

“exceeded the outer boundaries of its discretion”

deemed

issues of common

Klein’s securities expertise irrelevant to

law

fraud. Additionally, Investor

argues that the trial court’s analysis

was not

Recovery

consistent with

the legal standards applicable because Klein’s testimony

is

relevant to the materiality of the alleged nondisclosures.

applicable legal standards. Idaho’s
materiality without
Watts, 131

Idaho

at

common law fraud deﬁnes

any reference

t0

619-20, 962 P.2d

at

securities laws.

See

390-91. The district

court appropriately concluded that the jury could determine
the issue of materiality without an opinion

law and the expectations of the

on

securities

securities industry. Klein’s

testimony would not bear on the objective value that an
investor

would place on the

disclosures because the obj ective

standard uses a reasonable person standard. See id. at 620, 962

As

a preliminary matter,

we

note that Investor Recovery

P.2d at 391. Analyzing whether a reasonable person would

misconstrues the district court’s holding on materiality.

ﬁnd

Investor Recovery contends that Klein’s testimony on the

require a securities industry perspective. Further, the expert

of materiality

testimony does not bear on the subjective materiality of the

securities industry is relevant to the issue

because Hopkins and Murphy operate in the securities

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson

Reuters.
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the information material to their investment does not
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a form of a security, the

PPM expressly states that the fund is

that

Hopkins and Murphy were Hopkins Financial’s agents,

not registered with state or federal securities agencies. Thus,

acting with apparent authority to bind Hopkins Financial.

the district court’s conclusion that the jury did not need the aid

disagree.

of a securities expert

was within
not abuse

its

to

common law

understand

materiality

discretion. Accordingly, the district court did

its

discretion in excluding Klein’s testimony.

Investor Recovery’s argument and the facts supporting

not raise a genuine issue of material
directs this

summary judgment.

it

do

Investor Recovery

argues create an issue of material fact

regarding Hopkins and Murphy’s

work

in

both the fund and

Hopkins Financial. However, Investor Recovery’s opposition
to

1.

fact.

it

Court to several pages of alleged undisputed facts

in the record that

C. The district court did not err in granting Hopkins
Financial

We

Hopkins Associates’ motion

Standard 0f Review

summary judgment on

for

any of the deposition testimony

this issue did not cite to

or evidence presented on appeal. Instead, Investor Recovery

We apply the same standard ofreview used by the trial court in
ruling

on a *418 motion

164 Idaho
proper

at

for

summary judgment.

716, 435 P.3d at 496.

Summary judgment

“no genuine dispute as

if there is

and the movant

is entitled to

I.R.C.P. 56(a). In

making

make

disputed facts and

any material

to

we

Thurston, 164 Idaho at 7 16, 435 P.3d at 496.
slight

all

reasonable inferences that can

be drawn from the record in favor of the non—moving

of evidence or only a

fact

construe

summary judgment.” Franklin

party.

A “mere scintilla

doubt as to the facts

is

insufﬁcient

to

withstand

v.

Hymas, 157 Idaho 632, 637, 339 P.3d 357, 362 (2014)

(quoting Corbridge

v.

Bldg. Supply C0.

Clarquuip. Ca, 112 Idaho

730

85, 87,

on

brieﬁng to

its

this Court,

and portions of Hopkins

and Murphy’s depositions without speciﬁc record

citations.

is

judgment as a matter of law.”

this determination,
all

Thurston,

relies

P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986)).

The

“trial

court

not required to search the record looking

is

may

for evidence that
fact; the

create a genuine issue of material

party opposing the

summary judgment

is

required to

bring that evidence to the court’s attention.” Valiant Idaho,

LLC

v.

VP

Ina,

164 Idaho 314, 328, 429 P.3d 855, 869

(2018) (quoting Esser Elec.
Inc.,

v.

Lost River Ballistics Techs.,

145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008)). Here,

Investor Recovery failed to bring the evidence that

upon on appeal

relies
its

it

now

to the district court’s attention in

opposition to Hopkins Associates’

motion. Accordingly, the

district court

summary judgment

did not err in failing to

construe disputed facts in Investor Recovery’s favor.

2.

show a genuine dispute 0f

Investor Recovery failed to

Investor Recovery’s Vicarious liability argument based

agency

material fact regarding Hopkins Financial.

also

fails.

In opposition

to

on

summary judgment

below, and in this appeal, Investor Recovery seeks to hold
Investor Recovery contends that the district court erred
in

entering

The

summary judgment

district court

Financial,

granted

Hopkins Financial.

for

summary judgment

concluding that

Investor

for

Recovery

Hopkins
failed

to

produce any evidence that Hopkins Financial participated in
the allegations

beyond

their role

deﬁned

in the

Hopkins Financial

Hopkins and Murphy—based on apparent
Recovery argues

that

with apparent authority
arises

from the

its

agents—

authority. Investor

Hopkins and Murphy “were agents
bind [Hopkins Financial]. This

to

fact that they

employees of Hopkins

PPM.

through the acts of

liable

were the owners and controlling

Financial.”

Even accepting

that

Hopkins and Murphy were Hopkins Financial’s agents,
“‘10

On

its

Investor

Recovery argues

that

the

Investor Recovery’s argument

is still

meritless.

court erred in failing to construe disputed facts

district

in

appeal,

favor.

Speciﬁcally, Investor Recovery asserts that

whether communications sent

to investors

were on behalf

of the fund or Hopkins Financial was a disputed

fact.

Apparent authority

is

“the

power held by an agent

or other

actor to affect a principal’s legal relationship with third
parties

when

a third party reasonably believes the actor

In support of this argument, Investor Recovery cites to

has the authority to act 0n behalf of the principal and

multiple communications pertaining to the fund sent to

that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”

the individual investors
Further, Investors
liability

on Hopkins Financial’s

Recovery bases

on an agency

its

theory. Investor

WESTLAW © 2020 Thomson

letterhead.

claim of Vicarious

Recovery

Reuters.

No

asserts

Jones

v.

HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp, 147 Idaho 109,

113-14, 206 P.3d 473, 477-78 (2009) (quoting Restatement
(Third)

claim to original U.S.

ongency,

§ 2.03 (2006)). In opposition
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2020

on appeal, Investor Recovery *419

produce any

failed to

evidence that the individual investors reasonably believed

with Hopkins and

that their interactions

Murphy were on

behalf of Hopkins Financial instead of the ﬁlnd. Instead,
Investor Recovery’s arguments focus exclusively

and Murphy’s alleged actions and
within both
in

district court’s

conclusions under Idaho

I.R.C.P. 54(e). Investor

Code 12-120(3) and

Recovery amended its

appeal, arguing that Idaho

Code

initial

notice of

section 12-120(3) does not

apply to any of Investor Recovery’s claims.

their respective roles

Investor Recovery included one line

entities.

Amended

its

on Hopkins

Hopkins Associates ﬁled a cross—appeal, challenging the

Complaint, stating that “[t]he assignors of

Idaho Code section 12-120(3) only provides an award of
attorney fees for a prevailing party.

Howard

Perry, 141

v.

we
we also vacate the district

claims to Investor Recovery reasonably believed that the acts

Idaho 139, 143, 106 P.3d 465, 469 (2005). Because

and omissions of [Hopkins and Murphy] referenced

vacate the district court’s judgment,

in this

complaint were on behalf of Hopkins Financial.” Despite
this

conclusory allegation, Investor Recovery failed to allege

court’s attorney fee award.
party. Id. This

At

present, there

is

no prevailing

Court has refused to address an attorney fee

facts,

evidence, or argument regarding the individual

award under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) when there

investors’

reasonable belief about their interactions with

prevailing party. Id. Thus,

any

Hopkins and Murphy

in

its

opposition to summaryjudgment.

Rather, Investor Recovery cites to documents in the record
that

were

sent to the individual investors regarding their

debentures in the fund on Hopkins Financial’s letterhead.

As

noted above, however, these facts were not provided to the
district court to

In fact, the

mostly

consider in ruling on

documents

trial exhibits,

considered

at the

motion. In

its

“not

which the

time

it

trial

district court

on

cites to are

could not have

summary judgment

this

documents

failed to connect

were before the

exhibits

on summary judgment.”
these

ruled

summary judgment.

Recovery

fact.

remand, the

the lawsuit involved a

and

district court

(2)

whether the

commercial transaction

pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3). First
v.

Land

Title

ofNez Perce

Cnty., Ina,

Bank 0f

165 Idaho 813,

824, 452 P.3d 835, 846 (2019); Portfolio Recovery Assocs.,

LLC v. MacDonald,

162 Idaho 228, 236, 395 P.3d 1261, 1269

(2017).

exist

them

in the
to

court

trial

other than stating that

Further,

Investor Recovery

record,

any evidence of

their

impact on

the individual investors’ reasonable beliefs. Thus, Investor

Recovery

On

will determine: (1) the prevailing party;

Lincoln

no

under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and

I.R.C.P. 54(e) in this appeal.

gravamen of

is

Will not address the district

reply brief, Investor Recovery admitted that

of the

all

that Investor

court’s conclusions

we

failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material

Accordingly, the

district court

did not err in granting

E. Attorney fees for this appeal

Both

parties seek attorney fees for this appeal.

above, there

is

party prevails
that the

As

stated

n0 present prevailing party in this case. Ifeither

upon remand and the

gravamen of

this

transaction, the district court

suit

district court

constitutes a

determines

commercial

may award attorney fees

for this

appeal. See Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 162 Idaho at 236, 395

Hopkins Financial summary judgment.

P.3d at 1269.

D.

We vacate the district court’s attorney fee award.

**11
verdict,

Aﬁer Hopkins and Murphy

received

a directed

Hopkins Associates ﬁled a motion for $948,932.83

attorney fees and costs.

The

district court ultimately

Hopkins Associates $160,211
reaching this

total,

*420

III.

CONCLUSION

in

awarded

In light of the foregoing,

and

costs. In

directed

the district court ﬁrst held that

Hopkins

the district court’s

in attorney fees

verdict

for

we

reverse the district court’s

Hopkins and Murphy.

We

amended judgment dismissing

vacate
Investor

Associates was entitled to an award of attorney fees under

Recovery’s claims and awarding attorney fees and remand

Idaho Code section 12- 120(3). Pursuant to

the case for further proceedings consistent With this opinion.

under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(6), the
concluded that the

total fee

its

discretion

district court

requested was not reasonable

and awarded Hopkins Associates approximately half of the
attorney fees requested, $450,000.

The

district court

determined that of that $450,000, only one-third of
attributable to

it

Further,

we hold that the district court did not err in excluding

Investor Recovery’s expert witness at
in granting

trial,

nor did

err

it

Hopkins Financial summary judgment. Attorney

then

fees for this appeal

was

forth above.

No

may be awarded by the district court as

costs are

set

awarded on appeal.

commercial transactions under Idaho Code

section 12-1206).
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